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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD J. RICHARDSON, GROVEL. 
COOK and WAYNE WEAVER, indiv-
idually and for an on behalf 
of all similarly situated share-
holders of Major Oil Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ARIZONA FUELS CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, EUGENE DALTON, 
an individual, DEANNA J. DALTON, 
an individual, and MAJOR OIL 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
No. 15691 
This is a "class action" brought on behalf of 
shareholders of Major Oil Corporation seeking the appoint-
ment of a receiver for Major Oil Corporation as well as 
the recovery of funds allegedly diverted from Major Oil 
Corporation by its management and "controlling" share-
holders. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On January 25, 1978, the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County entered an Order styled "Order 
Appointing a Receiver and Allowance of Class Action," 
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(herein "Order") (R-109) by ·which Order the District 
Court: 
(a) Granted Plaintiffs-Respondents' 
(herein "Plaintiffs") Motion To Appoint Receiver 
for Defendant Major Oil Corporation, pursuant to 
Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
designated such a Receiver to assume possession 
of the property and to manage the operations and 
business of Major Oil Corporation; and 
{b) Granted Plaintiffs' Motion For An 
Order Allowing Maintenance of Class Action, 
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(l) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and certified this cause as a 
class action to proceed under the provisions of 
Rules 23(a) and (b) generally, but without 
specifying under which sub-division of Rule 
23 (b) this action is to proceed; and 
(c) Allowed prospective members of 
the Plaintiffs' putative class to exclude 
themselves from the binding and preclusive 
effect of any judgment entered in this action by 
filing a simple notice with the Clerk of the 
Court prior to March 1, 1978. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants (herein "Defendants") 
respectfully request this Court reverse the lower court's 
- 2 -
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order and rule as a matter of law: 
a) That there was an insufficient and inad-
equate record before the lower court to support the 
appointment of a Receiver, and 
b) That the case at bar must proceed as a 
shareholder's derivative action pursuant to Rule 23.1 
of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure as the only claims 
asserted by the Plaintiffs are not individual, but 
derivative in nature and properly belong to Major Oil 
Corporation. In the alternative, Defendants urge this 
Court to remand the action to the lower court for the 
purpose of designating under which subsection of Rule 
23(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure this action is 
to proceed with instructions that members of the putative 
class be precluded from excluding themselves from the 
binding and preclusive effect of any judgment entered in 
this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Unfortunately, the record is totally bereft of 
any evidence from which the facts of this action can be 
ascertained. At the time of the hearing on Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Appoint Receiver and Motion for Certification of 
Class, the only allegations of fact before the lower court 
were contained in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint (R-2); 
there were no affidavits of record, no evidence was there 
presented and Defendants had yet to answer Plaintiffs' 
- 3 -
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Complaint as a Motion to Dismiss (R-26) was pending. The 
only ostensible facts appearing of record are: (a) that 
Plaintiffs, by their own admission, are shareholders of 
Major Oil Corporation; (b) Arizona Fuels Corporation holds 
4 7% of the outstanding shares of Major Oil Corporation 
(R-2, 112); (c) defendants Eugene and Deanna Dalton are 
managing officers, directors, allegedly "controlling" 
shareholders, and otherwise corporate "insiders" with 
respect to both Arizona Fuels Corporation and its sub-
sidiary Major Oil Corporation (R-2, ~s 3 and 4). 
causes 
(R-3, 
The Plaintiffs acknowledge an attempt to assert 
of act ion which 
119) • A review 
belong to Major Oil Corporation. 
of the Complaint demonstrates 
that all of the "causes of action" set forth therein 
allege some form of mis-management, self-dealing, waste, 
conversion of corporate assets, or other breaches of 
fiduciary duties owed to Major Oil Corporation and its 
minority shareholders by virtue of Defendants' respective 
positions as officers, directors, and "controlling" 
shareholders thereof. 
On October 13, 1977, a hearing was held on 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Appoint Receiver (R-15) and Motion 
for an Order Allowing Maintenance of Class Action (R-14). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the lower court allowed 
Plaintiffs ten days to amend their Complaint to join Major 
Oil Corporation as a party-defendant ( R-31). On January 
24, 1978, the lower court entered its Order Appointing 
- 4 -
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Receiver and Allowance of Class Action ( R-109) whereby a 
receiver was appointed for Major Oil Corporation and the 
action was certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 
23(a) and (b). The lower court did not designate under 
which subsection of Rule 23(b) the action was to proceed. 
By Order dated June 1, 1978 ( R-227) this Court granted 
Defendants' Petition for Intermediate Appeal. 
I. 
THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER FOR MAJOR 
OIL CORPORATION ARGUMENT IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION THE LOWER COURT. 
A. The Only Alleged Facts Appearing of Record Herein 
are Contained Exclusively in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
The lower court interfered with the Defendants' 
lawful exercise and enjoyment of management prerogatives 
and property rights and, with a woefully inadequate 
record, appointed a Receiver to manage the affairs of 
Major Oil Corporation. The totality of evidence before 
the lower court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Appoint a 
Receiver consisted of the Complaint in this action. There 
were no affidavits of record and no testimony or other 
evidence was presented at the hearing on Plaintiffs' 
Motion. Every major allegation of operative fact in the 
Complaint is made "upon information and belief", i.e., 
suspicion and speculation. 
The allegations in paragraphs 14, 15, 17, 20, 
21, 23, 25, 26, 28 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 44 and 46 are made 
only upon such "information and belief", and the allega-
- 5 -
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tions in paragraphs 36 and 41 merely reincorporate the 
prior "information and belief" allegations of preceding 
paragraphs by reference. The Complaint is verified by a 
brief affidavit of only one of the Plaintiffs, Wayne 
Weaver. This verification recites that Plaintiff Weaver 
"has read the Complaint. .. {and) ... that the same is true 
of his own knowledge, except as to matters stated therein 
on information and belief, and as to such matters, he 
believes them to be true." {R-12). Nothing is said 
concerning whether or not he has any "information" to 
support his belief. An Amended Complaint was filed 
subsequent to the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Appoint 
Receiver but made de minimis change in the operative 
facts. 
B. Plaintiffs' Complaint Totally Failed to Satisfy the 
Minimum Evidentiary Requirements Necessary for the 
Appointment of a Corporate Receiver. 
The leading case on the evidentiary standard to 
be applied to a verified complaint seeking the appointment 
of a corporate receiver is State ex. rel. Fatzer vs. 
Molitor, 175 Kan. 317, 263 P.2d 207 {1953). In its 
opinion the Kansas Supreme Court exhaustively reviews all 
prior authorities on this issue and concludes: 
"The question is whether the usages of 
the Courts of equity permit the 
appointment of a receiver to take 
charge of a business on a petition 
verified on information and belief and 
on no other showing ... Counsel have 
furnished us no authorities whatever 
to sustain that proposition. Our 
search has demonstrated that the 
- 6 -
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universal rule is otherwise; that is, 
a receiver may only be appointed on 
evidence. This may be by testimony of 
witnesses or by affidavits or by 
a properly verified petition used as 
evidence. A petition verified on 
information and belief is not an 
affidavit and is not evidence--Hence 
it is not a showing upon which to base 
the appointment of a receiver." 263 P. 
2d at 212. 
Not surprisingly, the holding in Molitor has 
become a well established rule on the of law: 
"Where the material facts upon which 
the Court must rely in determining 
whether the appointment of a receiver 
is proper are alleged on information 
and belief and are sworn to in the 
same form, such an affidavit is 
insufficient." 16 Fletcher, 
Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7747. 
" ... a petition for the appointment of 
a receiver verified on information and 
belief instead of in positive terms is 
not admissable in evidence to sustain 
an appointment, or, to the extent 
that such a petition is verified on 
information and belief, it cannot be 
considered." 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, 
§ 111. 
"The evidence in support of an 
application for a receiver may be 
furnished ... by affidavits or by a 
properly verified petition used as 
evidence. However, a verified 
petition stating facts on information 
and belief is not an affidavit and 
is not evidence upon which a receiver 
may be appointed." 65 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Receivers, § 112. 
In the absence of any contrary statement from 
this Court, Defendants submit that what is clearly the 
majority rule and what may well be the "universal" rule on 
this issue should control and be adopted as the governing 
- 7 -
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law for the case at bar. Defendants inquiry has not 
yielded any cogent authority to the contrary and no Utah 
authority whatsoever. Judged by the widely accepted 
standard set forth above, Plaintiffs' Complaint is 
woefully insufficient. There was simply no basis in the 
record which warranted the appointment of a receiver. 
c. The Allegations of Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint 
were Too Vague and General to Support the Appointment 
of a Corporate Receiver. 
The management of a corporation is vested in its 
board of directors, §16-10-33, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, and before this statutory right of manage-
ment is removed by judicial fiat, the law is clear that a 
party seeking the appointment of a receiver must make a 
particularized showing of the necessity therefore. 
Conclusions and mere suspicions will not suffice: 
" ... the application for a receiver 
for a corporation must allege facts 
rather than mere legal conclusions, 
and a complaint based largely upon 
generalities and conclusions and upon 
imformation and belief is insufficient 
upon which (sic) to appoint a receiver." 
16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 
§ 7746. 
"It is incumbent upon one seeking the 
appointment of a receiver to allege 
in his petition, bill or application, 
and to prove, the grounds upon which 
he seeks such relief, and such showing 
must be clear, strong, and convincing. 
He must allege and prove the necessity 
and propriety of the appointment, 
including the existence of a state of 
facts showing the danger that the 
property or fund in question may be 
lost, removed, or materially injured. 
The party applying for a receiver must 
allege specific facts rather than 
- 8 -
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broad conclusions. Thus, fraud must 
be alleged with particularity; 
broad and vague allegations of fraud 
will not suffice." 65 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Receivers, § 112. 
"Mere general charges of fraud and 
mismanagement will not authorize the 
appointment of a receiver at the 
instance of a minority stockholder. 
Furthermore, the mismanagement of the 
directors of a corporation and the 
danger of loss or injury to the rights 
of the complainant stockholder should 
be clearly proved in order to warrant 
the appointment; the power should 
be clearly proved in order to warrant 
the appointment; the power should 
never be exercised in a doubtful 
case." 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, 
§ 113. 
Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs simply 
and clearly failed to make any adequate showing whatsoever 
to support their Motion for Appointment of a Receiver for 
Major Oil Corporation and that the lower court erred in 
appointing a receiver based upon the vague and unsupported 
allegations in the Complaint. 
II. 
CERTIFICATION OF THIS ACTION 
AS A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO 
RULE 23(c}(l} WAS SUPERFLUOUS 
AND ERRONEOUS 
A. This Action Constitutes Nothing More Than a Simple 
Shareholder's Derivative Suit. 
It should be clear, almost beyond cavil, 
that this action is, in both substance and reality, 
little more than an ordinary, garden-variety share-
holder's derivative suit. That it is at least partially 
so is apparently admitted even by the Plaintiffs (R-2, 
- 9 -
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119): that it is entirely so is, consequently, the major 
point of contention between the parties. 
The proper resolution of this question ulti-
mately turns upon the crucial, if semantically confusing, 
distinction between a class action of shareholders and a 
shareholder's derivative suit. Were there no such 
distinction, Rule 1 23. 1 , of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure would be a mere gratuitous superfluity somehow 
appurtenant to Rule 23 2 itself, and an action such 
as the present case could proceed ambiguously with the 
sort of vague deference to both rules exhibited by the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
however, both evince and require a higher degree of 
analytical precision. The distinction to be observed is 
that between the aggregation of the individual claims of 
putative class members, in this case shareholders, and the 
secondary or representative enforcement of a single set of 
claims held by a separate entity, i.e., the corporation. 
The preliminary determination of whether an 
action commenced by a shareholder states individual claims 
peculiar to himself or, alternately, corporate claims 
which he may assert only derivatively and on behalf of 
the corporation, if at all, is at once elementary and 
essential to his standing before the court and to the 
1
see Appendix A for the text of Rule 23.1. 
2
see Appendix B for the text of Rule 23. 
- 10 -
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procedural requirements of the action. Should a share-
holder assert an individual cause of action, he may, of 
course, proceed with his suit as in any other case. But 
should he assert a corporate cause of action, he must 
satisfy the procedural demands of Rule 23.1. The mere 
fact that other shareholders may assert similar individual 
claims in their own actions or by intervention in his 
action does not transform the shareholder's individual 
claims into corporate claims. So a shareholder who 
commences a class action on behalf of all other share-
holders does not thereby succeed in somehow changing what 
would otherwise be an aggregation of individual claims 
into a corporate claim. 
The fallacy of the lower court's ruling lies 
in precisely this facile equation: to sue as the repre-
sentative of all shareholders is necessarily to sue as 
the representative of the corporation; but the real danger 
in this sophism consists in the corollary error: one 
cannot sue as a representative of the corporation (i.e. 
derivatively) lest one sues as the representative of all 
shareholders (i.e. in a class action). Such seductive 
illogic ultimately ends in the conclusion that Rule 23.1 
is largely, if not entirely, superfluous. 
Defendants submit that a shareholders derivative 
suit is a well-established device of equity jurisdiction 
whereby ~ shareholder may sue derivatively for and 
on behalf of the corporation when the corporation itself 
- 11 -
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is wrongfully prevented from or wrongfully refuses to 
assert its rightful claims. See generally: Ross vs. 
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 90 S.Ct 733, 24 L.Ed 2d 729 
(1970), 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, §5939 et. 
Moreover, the determination of whether a share-
holder's claims are individual and personal or are 
corporate and derivative is properly made by the court 
upon the basis of the allegations appearing on the face of 
the Complaint. 
Aside from the fact that the Plaintiffs blithely 
admit that all of the claims presented in their Complaint 
are corporate claims "belonging" to Major Oil Corporation 
(R-2 ,18) and that they are suing derivatively for and on 
behalf of that corporation, the characterization of these 
claims could hardly be otherwise, even sans such admis-
sions, since a brief review of the Complaint reveals only 
corporate claims. The authorities are unequivocal in 
connection with the proper characterization of these 
claims: 
"The Court will make this determination 
(of whether the Complaint states a 
corporate-derivative or an individual 
cause of action) from the nature 
of the suit as it appears from the 
pleadings, and the choice may be a 
difficult one. It is clear that an 
action must be derivative when the 
directors are charged with the waste 
of corporate assets in breach of 
fiduciary duty, when contracts are 
attacked as ultra vires as to the 
corporation, when mismanagement is 
is charged, or when an outsider is 
sued for an alleged wrong to the 
- 12 -
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corporation." Note, "Developments in 
the Law -- Multiparty Litigation in 
the Federal Courts," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 
877, at 944-945 (1958) (footnotes 
omitted). 
"While an injury to the corporation 
resulting from wrongdoing, fraud or 
negligence of corporate officers 
operates indirectly, as an injury 
to stockholders, the injury to stock-
holders is secondary and the injury to 
the corporation primary. A stock-
holder cannot, as an individual as 
distinguished from a representative 
of the corporation, sue directors 
or other corporate officers for 
mismanagement, negligence or the 
like, on a cause of action which 
belongs to the corporation. In 
other words, the remedial rights 
of minority stockholders with respect 
to wrongs committed against the 
corporation by the officers and 
directors in the management of 
corporate affairs are derivative 
rights and any action taken by the 
stockholders to redress such wrongs 
must be for the benefit of the 
corporation. He cannot sue to set 
aside a contract made in fraud upon 
corporate rights. A stockholder 
cannot sue as an individual to 
recover damages for a conspiracy 
among the majority stockholders 
or corporate officers to wreck the 
corporation. Improper manipulation 
of funds by the controlling stock-
holder creates a cause of action 
in favor of the corporation rather 
than in favor of a stockholder as 
an individual, as does a wrongful 
diversion of corporate assets." 
13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 
§5924 (footnotes omitted). See 
further; Lattin, Corporations, §102 
( 1971). 
The causes of action at issue herein are 
perforce corporate claims. This action does not involve 
an amalgam of discrete claims held by various individuals 
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bound together, if at all, only by certain common ques-
tions of law or fact, which, if they predominate, may 
warrant their joinder into a cumbersome class action under 
Rule 23(b)(3). On the contrary, the particular plaintiffs 
in this case assert no direct, personal causes of action 
of their own. !'!_ fortiori, the members of their putative 
class can assert no such individual causes of action 
personal to themselves, lest Plaintiffs cease to be 
representative of them. Rather, the Plaintiffs in this 
case have standing to assert but one set of claims--the 
claims of the corporation--and not a myriad of multi-
farious individual claims held by various far-flung 
shareholders of the corporation. Most assuredly, all 
shareholders will benefit by a corpoate recovery herein, 
and, to be sure, any shareholder could bring this action, 
assuming that he met the minimum standards of Rule 23.1. 
But to say that "anyone can sue" and "everyone will 
benefit" simply does not amount to a persuasive showing of 
the necessity of a class action, for it does not alter the 
immutable fact that whoever sues, sues for the corpora-
tion, and whoever benefits, benefits because of the 
corporation. By overlooking the pervasive "corporateness" 
of the claims and, ultimately, of the action, the lower 
court misconceived the essential nature of this type of 
litigation and confused and complicated its procedures 
needlessly. The lower court erred in allowing the action 
to proceed as a class action. 
- 14 -
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B. It Constituted Prejudicial Error To Allow this Action 
to Proceed as a Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action. 
It has resulted in very real prejudice to the 
Defendants herein to allow the Plaintiffs to proceed as a 
Rule 23 class action as various shareholders have elected 
to "opt out" of the litigation. At the very best, cert-
ification of this cause as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
was a superfluous, erroneous and obfuscating complication 
of the proceedings. But the Defendants' objections go far 
beyond legal metaphysics and procedural technicalities. 
At the outset, it should be clear that it 
makes little practical difference to the Defendants 
whether the Plaintiffs elect to proceed herein as a Rule 
23 (b) ( 1) class action or as a Rule 23.1 shareholders 
derivative suit. Indeed, Defendants were somewhat 
bemused by Plaintiffs' apparent willingness to assume the 
not inconsiderable expenses and delays attendant upon a 
full blown class action, at least in the first instance. 
See: Eisen vs. Carlisle & Jacguelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179, 
94 S.Ct 2140, 2153, 40 L. Ed 2d 732 (1974) (Plaintiffs 
must bear the initial costs of notice under Rule 23(c)(2) 
"as part of the ordinary burden of financing (their) own 
suit.") This ostensible eagerness to undertake the 
arduous and costly process of providing "the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances" is particularly 
remarkable in view of the fact that it may well be 
largely, if not entirely, unnecessary. Nevertheless, the 
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lower court has allowed Plaintiff to proceed under Rule 
23(b)(3) rather than under Rule 23(b)(l). That is to say, 
Plaintiffs indisputably have attempted to accord all 
members of their putative class not only notice of this 
action but also an opportunity to "opt out" of the pre-
elusive effect of any judgment rendered herein; it is 
at this latter point that the Defendants balk. 
If this action can be characterized as a class 
action at all, it must be classified as a Rule 23(b) (1) 
action or, in the venerable vernacular of the former Rule, 
a "true" class action. See: Note, "Developments in the 
Law--Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts," 71 
Harv. L. Rev. 874 at 956 (1958). As such, any judgment 
rendered in this action necessarily should be binding on 
all class members, i.e., on all shareholders. Rule 
23(c)(3) clearly mandates such~ judicata in connection 
with a Rule 23(b)(l) action, and states: 
(3) The judgment in an action 
maintained as a class action under 
subdivision (b)(l) or (8)(2) (sic), 
whether or not favorable to the 
class, shall include and describe 
those whom the court finds to be 
members of the class. The judgment 
in an action maintained as a class 
action under subdivision (b)(3), 
whether or not favorable to the 
class, shall include and specify 
or describe those to whom the 
notice provided in subdivision 
(c)(2) was directed, and who have 
not requested exclusion, and whom 
the court finds to be members of 
the class. 
Once again, Plaintiffs' Complaint is confusingly 
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indefinite on this subject. Whereas paragraph 73 of the 
Complaint ( R-3) is devoted largely to a verbatim incanta-
tion of Rule 23(b)(l), which, although general, is at 
least arguably appropriate, paragraph 84 seems to evoke, 
3Paragraph 7 of the Complaint states: 
4 
"That plaintiff alleges that this 
action should be maintained as a 
class action in that: (1) the 
prosecution of separate actions 
by individual members of the class 
would create a risk of: (a) incon-
sistent or varying adjudiciation 
(sic) with respect to individual 
members of the class which would 
establish incompatible standards 
of conduct for the party opposing 
the class, (b) adjudications with 
respect to individual members of 
the class which would as a practical 
matter be dispositive of interests 
of other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially 
impair or impede their ability to 
protect their interest; ( 2) the 
defendants have acted or refused 
to act on grounds generally appli-
cable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief 
or corresponding declaratory relief 
with respect to the class as a whole; 
and 
3) The questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions 
effecting only individual members, 
and that a class action is superior 
to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of 
the controversy between the parties." 
Paragraph 8 of the Complaint states: 
"That the class is so numberous 
(sic) that joinder of all members 
is impracticable in that there are 
questions of law or fact common 
to the class that the claims or 
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if not recite, the language of Rule 23(b)(3). 
The practical consequences of the proper 
classification of this action are quite considerable. 
Very simply, the problem is that in a Rule 23(b) (3) class 
action, members of the class who "opt out" under Rule 
23(c)(3) are simply not bound by any judgment entered 
therein. That is to say, such "opt-outs" can subsequently 
bring suit on the self-same claims against the erstwhile 
class defendants, and under the particular circumstances 
of this case such repetitive actions are not merely 
vexatious and exorbitant, but also egregiously unfair. So 
while certification of a Rule 23(b)(l) class action under 
the present circumstances may be a relatively "harmless" 
mistake, failing to designate the class and, therefore, 
arguably allowing the prosecution of a Rule 23(b)(3) class 
action results in an execrable burden of risk being 
imposed upon the Defendants. 
The difference in this distinction is easily 
demonstrated. In this case, the right of recovery, if 
any, both obviously and admittedly "belongs" to the 
corporation. While the shareholders may have standing to 
sue in equity, still they must sue derivatively for and on 
defenses of the representative 
parties are typical to the claims 
or defenses of the class and that 
the named party plaintiffs as 
representative parties will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
- 18 -
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behalf of the corporation. (See: Sect. IIA, supra,) 
Now, should each shareholder be permitted to "opt out" of 
this action and ipso facto be allowed to bring his own 
action on these claims, the corporation and through it, 
the shareholders--perhaps even including the present 
Plaintiffs--will be accorded a "second bite" at the 
proverbial apple. This would not result in many different 
suits, but rather in the same suit many different times. 
Therein lies the essential difference upon which the 
Defendants so vociferously insist. The real-party-in 
interest in this law suit, as in any shareholders deriva-
tive action, is the corporation. See ~· .9.·: Beyerbach 
vs. Juno Oil Co., 265 P.2d 1, at 11 (Cal., 1954). When 
the adjudication necessarily determines corporate claims, 
it is simply nonsensical to speak of shareholders "opting 
out" of the action in any meaningful way. The logical 
upshot of the lower court's ruling on this issue is not 
merely the preservation of individual claims--the paradigm 
of the Rule 23(b) (3) class action provisions,--but rather 
the repetitive presentation of the same corporate claims. 
c. The Established Procedures for a Shareholders Deriva-
tive Suit Under Rule 23.1 are fully Adequate for the 
Prompt and Just Adjudication of the Issues Presented 
in this Action. 
The 1972 amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which substantially parallel the 1966 revision 
of the Federal Rules in this regard, established Rule 23.1 
as a separate, self-contained rule on the subject of 
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"derivative actions by shareholders." It should be 
observed that Rule 23.1 incorporates some but, most 
importantly, not all of the procedures contained within 
Rule 23, dealing with class actions. In particular, Rule 
23.1 contains its own explicit provisions concerning the 
adequacy of representation by the shareholder-plaintiff 
and the necessity of judicial supervision of compromise 
settlements. These two provisions are highly similar to, 
if not duplicative of, the requirements found in Rule 
23(a)(4) and Rule 23(e) with respect to class actions. 
But equally as significant in this context are the ap-
parent "omissions" in Rule 23.1. Foremost among these 
ostensible omissions is the studied avoidance in Rule 23.1 
of anything like the rather elaborate notice provisions of 
Rule 23. Indeed, Rule 23.1 appears to affirmatively 
require notice to all shareholders only in connection with 
a settlement or dismissal of the derivative action and 
then only in the Court's sound discretion. 
Aside from its status as a separate rule, 
bereft of any cross references or other apparent inter-
relationship to Rule 23 proper, this pattern of selective 
but limited adoption of class action procedures in Rule 
23.1 argues strongly for a clear distinction between class 
actions in general, whether commenced by shareholders or 
others, and the generic device of equitable jurisprudence 
known as the shareholder's derivative suit. Moreover, it 
is rather difficult to comprehend the need for a separate 
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rule on shareholder's derivative suits if, in fact, such 
actions are all but indistinguishable from shareholder's 
class actions, as Plaintiffs curiously bipolar Complaint 
seems to suggest. On the contrary, it can hardly be 
presumed that this Court was needlessly redundant in 
adding Rule 23.1 to Rule 23 proper. 
Since the present action is at bottom merely a 
shareholder's derivative suit, Defendants submit that the 
provisions of Rule 23.1 should properly govern its proce-
dures. Defendants suggest that the procedures established 
by Rule 23.1, being designed for precisely this type of 
action, are more appropriate, expeditious, and otherwise 
workable than the related, but irrelevant, procedures of 
Rule 23. Indeed, little more than confusion, expense 
and delay are to be gained by stretching the allegations 
of Plaintiffs' Complaint into a class action. Conversely, 
little or nothing of substance is to be lost by treating 
this action as precisely what it appears to be; a share-
holders derivative suit. The following brief comparison 
and functional analysis of the respective rival procedures 
in the present context may serve to illustrate Defendants' 
pragmatic point. 
Ordinarily a Court, when confronted with a Rule 
23(c) motion for certification as a class action, must 
determine (1) whether the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have 
been satisfied and, if so, (2) whether the action falls 
within one of the categories established in Rule 23(b) • 
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See: 7A, Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
§1785 (1972). The criteria of Rule 23(a) simply do not 
apply to a shareholder's derivative suit with any cogency 
whatsoever. In a derivative action it makes little 
difference whether the shareholders are so numerous that 
their joinder in one action would be "impracticable." The 
joinder of all shareholders is simply not necessary in a 
derivative suit. Rule 23.1 explicitly acknowledges that 
such an action can be brought by any "one or more" share-
holders. Can it be seriously argued that Rule 23(a) (1) 
limits the availability of a derivative action to only 
those shareholders in corporations large enough to make 
the joinder of all shareholders impracticable? 
Similarly, it seems quite beside the point in 
the context of a shareholders derivative suit to inquire 
whether the plaintiff's claims are "typical" of those held 
by the remaining shareholders. The individual claims of 
the shareholders are not at issue in a derivative suit. 
How, then, can a court in such a case make a meaningful 
determination that the plaintiff's claims are somehow 
sufficiently "typical" of the claims of the remaining 
shareholders, when, in point of fact, there are no in-
dividual shareholder claims at all, but only corporate 
claims common to all and peculiar to none? No less 
Pickwickian is the inquiry as to whether questions of law 
or fact are "common" to the shareholders in such a case. 
Most assuredly, it cannot be the intention of the Rules to 
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require a court to apply such utterly incongruous and 
somewhat vacuous standards to determine whether a share-
holders derivative action is to be maintained. 
By contrast, Rule 23.1 establishes procedures 
reasonably responsive to the singular demands of a share-
holders derivative action. To determine the standing of 
any plaintiff to maintain such an action, Rule 23.1 
requires a showing that he was a shareholder during the 
relevant period. Moreover, Rule 23.1 directs the court's 
attention specifically to the adequacy of the plaintiff's 
representation of the shareholder's interests "in en-
forcing the right of the corporation" of which they are 
members. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he 
has exhausted his intracorporate recourse and that the 
corporation either has refused or is unable to commence 
the action on its own. 
By indulging in intellectual contortions of no 
mean rigor, perhaps the Rule 23 (a) typicality, common-
ality, and adequacy standards, although, in any event, not 
the numerosity requirement, can be read as implying, if 
not saying, much the same thing as Rule 23 .1. Yet such 
argumentative contortions necessarily involve some 
distortion of the plain and, presumably, the intended 
meaning of the Rules at issue. Defendants are at a loss 
to see any compensating gain to redeem such a fiction, 
save perhaps the "problem" of avoiding their participation 
as shareholders in any corporate recovery realized upon 
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the Complaint's allegations of their own mal-, mis-, or 
nonfeasance. But a reasonably direct solution to that 
problem is well within the inherent equity jurisdiction of 
the court sitting in any shareholder's derivative suit. 
That is to say, the Court may order a direct pro-rata 
recovery to certain shareholders in lieu of a truly 
corporate recovery. See e.g.: Perlman vs. Feldmann, 219 
F.2d 172 (2d Cir.) cert. den. 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
Of course, there are certain not insigni-
ficant theoretical problems with such a device. See 
generally, Leech, "Transactions in Corporate Control," 
104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 809-825 (1956). The relative 
desirability of such a structured recovery remains an open 
question for the lower court to resolve at an appropriate 
juncture in this litigation. Rather, the salient point 
here consists in the observation that such relatively 
straightforward responses are available to the court to 
deal with such issues, as an alternative to the strained 
and needless invocation of the unwieldy procedures of a 
Rule 23 class action to accomplish largely the same 
result. 
Finally, it should be noted that proceeding with 
this cause as a class action raises notorious, but as yet 
unresolved, questions concerning notice to class members. 
While Rule 23 (c) ( 2) requires such notice at the outset in 
connection with a Rule 23(b)(3) action, Eisen vs. Carlisle 
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 s. Ct 2140, 40 L. Ed 2d 732 
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(1974), it is plausible that Rule 23(d)(2) may oblige the 
Court to require similar notice in Rule 23(b) (1) and 23 
(b)(2) actions as well. 7A, Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, §§1786, 1793 (1972). 
The delicacy and difficulty of the due process 
questions underlying the proper construction and inter-
pretation of these Rules cannot be gainsaid. Defendants, 
however, observe that in the class action context the 
representative, absentee adjudication of individually 
cognizable claims adds immeasurably to the gravity of the 
notice and due process questions at issue therein. By 
seeking class certification in this case, Plaintiffs 
have raised a panoply of due process issues which will 
necessitate the attentive and persistent consideration of 
the lower court throughout the pendancy of this action. 
Although by no means entirely expiated, the notice issues 
may prove to be a good deal less noisome to both counsel 
and the lower court in the context of a shareholder's 
derivative suit. 
As indicated, Rule 23.1 does not contain the 
same sort of textual mandate for notice to absent parties 
as does Rule 23 itself. Aside from whatever comfort 
such an exegesis of the respective rules may offer, it is 
certainly arguable that these textual differences reflect 
an underlying distinction of some persuasiveness. Since 
a derivative action does not implicate individually 
cognizable legal rights directly held by absentees, but, 
-25-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at most, affects the somewhat more attenuated secondary 
"rights" of shareholders to act as volunteers for the 
corporation, the property interests of the absentee 
shareholder are likely to be of a different and lesser 
order than those of a typical class member in his personal 
chose-in-action; the structure of "corporate democracy" 
further conditions these rights as well. That is to say, 
the ostensible "right" to proceed as the self-appointed 
representative of the corporation in an apparent cause 
celebre against alleged malefactors has never been 
recognized as absolute in the same sense that a typical 
class member's anti-trust, securities, consumer or tort 
claims have been understood to be "vested." Consequently, 
the most pervasive and fundamental interests of an 
absentee shareholder in the context of a derivative suit 
are largely co-terminous with those of the corporation; 
primarily, they consist in the interests of both in the 
responsible and vigorous prosecution of the corporate 
claims against the alleged corporate wrongdoers. Defen-
dants submit that judicial supervision of the adequacy 
of representation under Rule 23.1 may suffice to protect 
this interest with much greater constitutional efficacy 
than in the case of a paradigmatic class action under Rule 
23 itself. 
Even in the class action milieu, there is 
some not inconsiderable authority to the effect that the 
adequacy of the representation provided by the named 
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plaintiff, albeit perhaps not the sine ~ non of an 
enforceable judgment, is nonetheless a material factor 
to be weighed in the due process balance. Hence, to the 
extent that the representation provided by the class 
plaintiff is satisfactory, notice to individual class 
members of their rights to intervene through their own 
counsel or, alternately, to "opt out" in a tacit demon-
stration of "no confidence" in the class representatives, 
is somewhat less crucial from the constitutional per-
spective. Hansberry vs. Lee, 311 u.s. 32 at 42-43, 61 s. 
Ct. 2, 85 L. Ed 3 (1940), Wetzel vs. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co., 508 F. 2d 239, 256 (3d. Cir.) cert. den. 
421 U.S. 1011 (1975), Northern Natural Gas Co. vs. 
Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan.) rev . .£!)_ ~ 
grounds 441 F. 2d 704 (lOth. Cir. 1971), Comment, "The 
Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in 
Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1217, 1224-1231 (1975). 
There is, of course, no consensus on this point 
in connection with class actions as a generic type of 
litigation. See: Eisen vs. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F. 
2d 555, 564-565 (2d. Cir., 1968) (notice is a due process 
requirement in all class actions). The Supreme Court in 
Eisen premises its holding principally, if not exclu-
sively, upon a textual construction and interpretation of 
Rule 23(c)(2) itself, thereby avoiding a direct opinion on 
the overriding due process issues raised therein. So the 
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constitutional question is 
class actions other than 
variety. Here adequacy of 
deal more meaningful than 
still open in 
those of the 
the context of 
Rule 23(b)(3) 
representation may be a good 
notice as the talisman of 
due process. Dam, "Class Action Notice, Who Needs It?" 
1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1318, 1402-1416 (1976). 
Defendants submit that the argument for the 
constitutional sufficiency of "adequate representation" 
is strongest in connection with derivative suits. 
Consequently, notwithstanding Eisen, it cannot be glibly 
concluded that the absence of notice requirement in Rule 
23.1 comparable to those found in Rule 23 itself belies 
any constitutional infirmity in a typical derivative suit 
procedure, particularly when the underlying interests of 
the abse~tee plaintiffs are so radically different both in 
nature and in extent in a derivative action as opposed to 
a class action. 
Defendants urge that the lower court erred in 
allowing class action certification of this cause under 
Rule 23(c). The reasons for this conclusion have been 
fully set forth above. In the light of the foregoing 
discussion, Defendants submit that the cumulative effect 
of all the necessary adjustments, if not machinations, 
necessary to fit this derivative action into the class 
action mold, result in more than merely procedural com-
plications. Rather, these complications are at once so 
pervasive and so intractible as to work a subtle but 
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substantial change in the very character of the equitable 
rights and remedies which Plaintiffs seek to enforce 
thereby. That is to say, the cumulative effect of these 
procedural innovations may contravene the substantive 
limitations of the deriviative action procedure alto-
gether. See: Note, "Developments in the Law--Class 
Actions," 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1353-1372 (1976). 
In any case, the fact remains that class 
certification of this action may well result in the 
creation of a procedural albatross of unnecessary and 
unmanageable proportions. The arguments are clear: 
First, this is simply and in realtity a derivative suit. 
It is not a class action. Plaintiffs' characterization 
cannot make it so. The essential nature of the claims 
which Plaintiffs assert are derivative and, in fact, 
archtypical of a shareholders derivative suit. Second, 
the procedures of Rule 23.1 are fully adequate for the 
efficacious and expeditious management of this action. 
Third, it is not necessary to indulge in the subterfuge of 
casting this action in the form of a class action merely 
to obtain an equitable apportionment of any recovery which 
may be realized herein. Such relief is available as a 
matter of course in the exercise of the court's inherent 
equity powers. Moreover, the costs in terms of procedural 
confusion, not to mention the expensive mechanics of 
providing any required notice to the putative class, 
outweigh any benefits reasonably to be derived from such 
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procedural innovation. Finally, as can be observed 
from a review of the record, shareholders have in fact 
elected to "opt out" of this litigation. Defendants are 
therefore exposed to the threat of separate future liti-
gation based upon precisely the same claims contained in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Defendants submit that the lower court erred in 
granting a class action certification in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court abused its discretion in ap-
pointing a receiver for Major Oil Corporation without any 
affirmative showing by the Plaintiffs of the need for such 
an appointment. A complaint verified upon information and 
belief will not, standing alone, support the appointment 
of a receiver. The appointment of a receiver on this 
basis seriously interferes with the Defendants' management 
prerogatives and substantial property rights and deprives 
the defendants of due process of law. The lower court's 
Order appointing a receiver should be reversed. 
This action is no more than a shareholders 
derivative action. Plaintiffs' claims are those of the 
corporation and not those of individuals. Under these 
circumstances, to certify the action as a class-action 
and to allow members of the class to "opt-out" precludes 
the res judicata effect of a judgment and exposes the 
Defendants to unwarranted and repeated litigation upon 
precisely the same claims found in the case at bar. The 
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lower court's Order certifying a class should be reversed. 
1978. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July, 
DAVID R. OLSJN,~ 
SUITTER, AXLAND & ARMSTRONG 
Suite 2150, Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROBERT WALTER JENSEN, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants were mailed 
postage prepaid to Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq. at 430 Judge 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Parker M. 
Nielson, Esq. at 320 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, this 31st day of July, 1978. 
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APPENDIX A 
Rule 23 .1. Derivative Actions by Shareholders 
In a derivative action brought by one or more 
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corpora-
tion or of an unincorporated assoc-1at16n, the corporation 
or associatron hav1ng fa1led to enforce a right which may 
properly be asserted by it, the complainant (sic) shall be 
verified and shall allege {1) that the plaintiff was a 
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of 
which he complains or that his share or membership there-
after devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that 
the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction 
on a court of the State of Utah which it would not other-
wise have. The complaint shall also allege with particu-
larity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to 
obtain the action he desires from the directors or com-
parable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders 
or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort. The derivative 
action may not be maintained if it appears that the 
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the shareholders or members similarly situ-
ated in enforcing the right of the corporation or associa-
tion. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court, and notice of the 
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to share-
holders or members in such manner as the court directs. 
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APPENDIX B 
Rule 23. Class Actions 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or 
more members of a class may sue or be sued as represen-
tative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class 
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracti-
cable, ( 2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, ( 3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 23(a) was amended by the Supreme 
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972. The 
amendment rewrote the provisions. For the rule prior 
to amendment, see the parent volume. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may 
be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of 
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by 
or against individual members of the class would 
create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudica-
tions with respect to individual members 
of the class which would establish incompa-
tible standards of conduct for the party 
opposing the class, or 
{B) adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the class which 
would as a practical matter be dispositive 
of the interests of the other members not 
parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to 
protect their interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has 
acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class, thereby making appro-
priate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief with respect to the class as 
a whole; or 
( 3) the court finds that the questions of 
law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting_ on~y 
individual members, and that a class act1on lS 
superior to other available methods for the fair 
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and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 
The matters pertinent to the findings include: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and 
nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
versy already commenced by or against members 
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesir-
ability of concentrating the litigation of the 
claims in the particular forum; (D) the d iffi-
culties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action. 
COM~IITTEE NOTE: Rule 23 (b) was amended by 
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 
amendment rewrote the provisions. 
the Supreme 
1972. The 
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class 
Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions 
conducted Partially as Class Actions. 
(1) As soon as practicable after the 
commencement of an action brought as a class 
action, the court shall determine by order 
whether it is to be maintained. An order under 
this subdivision may be conditional, and may be 
altered or amended before the decision on the 
mer1ts. 
(2) In any class action maintained under 
subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to 
the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort. The 
notice shall advise each member that (A) the 
court will exclude him from the class if he so 
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, 
whether favorable or not, will include all 
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) 
any member who does not request exclusion may, 
if he desires, enter an appearance through his 
counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained 
as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or 
(8)(2), (sic) whether or not favorable to the 
class, shall include and describe those whom the 
court finds to be members of the class. The 
judgment in an action maintained as a class 
action under subdivis1on (b) (3), whether or not 
favorable to the class, shall include and 
specify or describe those to whom the notice 
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provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and 
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the 
court finds to be members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be 
brought or maintained as a class action with 
respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may 
be divided into subclasses and each subclass 
treated as a class, and the provisions of this 
rule shall then be construed and applied accord-
ingly. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 23(c) was amended by the Supreme 
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972. The 
amendment rewrote the provisions. 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the 
conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court 
may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of 
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue 
repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence 
or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the 
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of 
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the 
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step 
in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, 
or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they 
consider the representation fair and adequate, to inter-
vene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come 
into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the represen-
tative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the 
pleading be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as 
to representation of absent persons, and that the action 
proceed accordingly; ( 5) dealing with similar procedural 
matters. The orders may be combined with an order under 
Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable 
from time to time. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 23 (d) was adopted by the Supreme 
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972. 
(e) Dismissal or compromise. A class action 
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval 
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or 
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in 
such manner as the court directs. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 23(e) was adopted by the Supreme 
Court on June 23, 1971, effective January 1, 1972. For 
the prior rule relating to dismissal or compromise of 
class action, see Rule 23(c) in the parent volume. 
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